
'mibal' is a state where the mind hasn't yet contacted any object, with no emotions expressed or objects perceived, remaining undisturbed.
TheConceptofMibal

The concept of "mibal" (未發思慮), the state of emotions not yet activated, is crucial in Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism, signifying unaroused emotions. Analyzing Zhu Xi's understanding of human nature and his works, "byeongsuljio" (中和舊說) and "gichukjio" (中和新說), we see that "mibalsik" is expressed through terms like "喜怒哀樂之未發" (emotions not yet aroused), "思慮未萌" (thoughts not yet sprouted), and "知覺不昧" (perceptions not obscured).

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Pre-state
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Husserl andHeideggerPhenomenology's,Of,TranscendentalStructures (1)

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Husserl andHeideggerPhenomenology's,Of,TranscendentalStructures (2)

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Poetic Languageand DivinePerspectiveCritiquing, On,Heidegger'sTranscendentalThought


mibalMeets,Western,View
my interpretation based on this is as follows.
In contrast, the concept of 未發 in Joseon introduces an active attitude in cognition.
This is not an attempt to integrate absolute truth through recognition,
nor to claim analytical superiority of one's cognition, but to set the object of cognition as oneself for the fundamental health of one's cognition.
In the state of 未發, which is a state of consciousness of 'actions unrelated to value creation',
Zhu Xi's philosophy aims to secure the 大本 through the practice of 居敬 and 存養 in everyday life.
The sage achieves the 中 that is 不偏不倚 in the state before feelings arise,
and taking this as the 大本,
always achieves the good of moderation in joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure.
Therefore, although phenomenology and the 未發 argument share the same epistemological proposition,
it seems that they tried to solve the metaphysical problems that later Heidegger had based on the relationship between me and myself,
not between me and the object.
(Here, it is recognized that the 'I' as the subject also functions as an object.)
Although this can be approached as a kind of metaphysics,
rather than building an epistemological foundation of experience through phenomenological reduction as seen in Husserl,
it emphasizes that even such an epistemological foundation of experience should be applied to phenomenological reduction.
In other words,
similar to phenomenological reduction or 'propositional attitudes' in analytic philosophy,
未發 also means a pure state of consciousness where subjective attitudes have been dropped.
Modern Korean Discourse on Mibal (未發) Surveying, Of, Contemporary Scholarship Debates
Additionally, the modern Korean discussions on the 未發 argument are summarized as follows:


In these modern Korean 未發 arguments:
문석윤 interpreted 퇴계's position as emphasizing 사려미맹 more than 지각불매, and interpreted 未發 as 'a state without any consciousness'.
In response, 이승환 argued in several papers that 사려미맹 and 지각불매 are not conflicting propositions, and that 未發 is not 'a state without any consciousness'.
문석윤 viewed '사려' and '지각' as mind activities of the same dimension, arguing that if there is perception, there should be thinking, and therefore there is no perception without thinking.
By exploring this philosophical discussion horizon, 이승환 argues that the dichotomous approach of explaining 未發 as either substance or practice makes it impossible to fully explain 未發 perception. Especially to clarify exactly what 未發 perception means, the meaning of 未發 as the mind activity of 虛靈不昧, which is neither 未發 as practice nor 未發 as substance, needs to be properly elucidated. And for this, it needs to be clarified what kind of mind 주희 refers to as the mind that penetrates nature and emotions in the new theory of equilibrium and harmony. In the end, the conclusion is the same as modern phenomenology.
